The road to China : Hong Kong\u27s transition to Chinese sovereignty by NEWMAN, David
Lingnan University 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working 
Paper Series 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
心 
1995 
The road to China : Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty 
David NEWMAN 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Newman, D. (1995). The road to China: Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty (CPPS Working 
Papers Series no.19). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/21 
This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究
中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy 
Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. 
Working Paper Series 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
No. 19 (4/95) CPPS 
THE ROAD TO CHINA: 
HONG KONG'S TRANSITION TO 
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY 
by 
Dr. David Newman 













No. 19 (4/95) CPPS 
THE ROAD TO CHINA: 
HONG KONG'S TRANSITION TO 
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY 
by 
Dr. David Newman 
嶺南學院圖書館
- 6 NOV 199為
H~GNAN COLLEGE Ll BR ÞRY 




THE ROAD TO CHINA: 
HONG KONG'S TRANSITION TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY 
ICAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical comment. Opinions 
xpressed in them are the author' s and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Editorial 
oards or Lingnan College. These papers may be freely circulated but they are not to be quoted without 
he written permission of the author. Please address comments and suggestions to the author or the series 
ditors. 
Editorial Bòard 
Centre [or Asian Pacific Studies: 
Dr. Brian Bridges 
Dr. Kui Yin Cheung 
Prof. Y. Y. Kueh (Director) 
Dr. David Newman 
Centre for Public Policy Studies: 
Dr. Wai Kin Che 
Mr. Jolm Dixon 
Prof. Y. Y. Kueh 
Prof. David Weimer (Director) 
。 David Newn1an 
Î 11 年以01
Dr. David Newman is University Senior Lecturer of Depalilnent of Social 
Sciences, Lingnan College, Hong Kong. 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
15 Stubbs Road 
Hong Kong 
Tel: 2572 2226 
Fax: 2591 0690 
1. Introduction 1 
"On Monday June 26, 1843 at 5 o'clock p.m." , the Treaty of Nanking was 
ratified and Hong Kong was declared a possession of Her Majesty the Queen of 
Great Britain. "The island of Hong Kong to be possessed in perpetuity by her 
Britannic Majesty, her heirs and successors..." (Sayer 1980: 21 5). The Treaty 
legally transferred sovereignty over Hong Kong Island from the Chinese to the 
British. Within sixteen years of the ratification of the Treaty of Nanking , during the 
second China War, the residents of Hong Kong Island looked longingly to the north 
to secure Kowloon Peninsula. Following China's defeat and under the terms of the 
1860 Convention of Beijing , Britain acquired slightly more than four additional 
square miles of land comprising the southern tip of Kowloon Peninsula and 
Stonecutters Island. Again , these lands were ceded in perpetuitγto the British 
Crown. The only leased territory in the Colony was acquired by the British in 1898 
under the Convention of Peking , following the Sino-Japanese War. The leased 
territory is known today as the New Territories , the area north of Boundary Street, 
and some 235 outlying islands , including Lantau and Lamma islands. The total 
additional area was 370.4 square miles (Lane 1990). At midnight on June 30, 
1997, all this land and its more than five million inhabitants are to be "returned" 
to China. 
1-' 
(t' /)) > This paperexamines the future |ega|structure of Hong Kong as endiSioned 
, This is part of a larger project in collaboration with Ors. Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and Alvin Rabushka , of the Hoover Institution , Stanford University, to 
examine the future of Hong Kong following the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. 
The project has been supported by a grant from the Staff Oevelopment and 
Scholarly Activities Committee of Lingnan College. I would like to thank Sebastian 
Tse , Brian Bridges and Oavid Weimer for their thoughtful comments. 
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under the Joint Declaration , the Basic Law of Hong Kong (BL) , and the Constitution 
of the People's Republic of China. It will examine what the parties agreed to 
regarding the future status and administration of Hong Kong and attempts to 
哇ighlLg些_~~~_~. ~! t~e problems al均已dy encou~tereg aJld so_me which may 司rise.
Following a discussion of the Joint Oeclaration and Basic Law, the issues of local 
governance, the legal system, personal rights and freedoms , the economic system, 
foreign affairs , and Memoranda on Travel Documents are addressed. Each section 
includes a discussion of the progress to date in the planning for the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1 997. 
11. The Joint Declaration and Basic Law 
The British first broached the issue of Hong Kong's future status with the 
于'l(:f
Chinese in 1 979 when Sir Murray MacLehose, the th é-h governor of Hong Kong , 
visited Peking. The nlatter was essentially swept under the rug by the Chinese and 
/ 
not raised again 川|已rime Minister Margaret That伽內 visit to Peking in 
September, 1982 (Bonavia 1985: 167). That visit began more than two years of 
negotiations , involving twenty-two rounds of meetings, culminating in the Joint 
Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People' s RepJ.1bJic of China on the Question of 
、二\((1) ( l\ 代 ψ
Hong Kong (the Joint Declaration or "JD").2 )\./ \. 
The Joint Declaration , a short document of only slightly more than 1100 
words , including the three annexes and two Memoranda, a total of just more than 
2 The complete text of the Joint Declaration can be found in various 
publications including Chan and Clark (1991) and Bueno de Mesquita , Newman and 
Rabushka (1 984). 
2 
手月三孔司;有TJ
8000 words, inalíerably changed Hong Kong's future and the fate of its 
inhabitants. 3 The Oeclaration addressed: the absolute return by the British of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong to the Chinese, the status and administration of Hong 
Kong after 1997, British responsibility for Hong Kong prior to the turnover, the 
Chinese commitment to cooperate with the British during the period of the 
transition from 1 984 to 1 997, the creation of a Sino-British Joint Liai,son Group, 
斗「六1二立三Æ .Aιι 介\ d、
\不可1 ~~ /J 、是L
and land leases. 
The Joint Oeclaration states thatl China "has decided to resume the exercise 
of sovereignty over Hong Kong (including Hong Kong IslanQ , Kowloon and the New 
Territories) with effect from 1 July 1997" and that "的e United Kingdom will restore_ _. 
Hong Kong to the P叫!“ Republic of China with eff叫 from 1 July 1997 . "川 /L) μ
/干，lf λ~ { 
The British never seriously considered the idea of retaining Hong Kong Island 
and Kowloon and just 叫J川2gJ.he_ I~_ased terri!ories 叭。er 1a cl~imr thai sove的gnty
.:..<卉\
to those parts of Hong Kong were permanently transferred to the British. Such a 
.，、
.-一一一一一一一一一…一-一-- '- 、 ι…巴一
carved-up Hong Kong simply would not have been viable as it would have lacked 
an airport , water supply, and source of fresh agricultural products (Ching 1985: 8) . 
/叭 i
Thus , with several stokes of a pen , the future sovereignty over all of Hong Kong 
will revert to China on Julγ1 ， 1997. 
One should keep in mind that this transfer of almost six million people is in 
Tjf //川
some ways unpreced e-"h ted. For some, this transfer of sovereignty is almost the 
品收 btL 
reverse mirror image of the collapse of the B色 ri in Wall and Iron Curtain . While 
boundaries have been adjusted throughout modern history, with some nations 
3 For a detailed discussion of the negotiations between the British and Chinese 
see Ching (1985); Bonavia (1985) and Roberti (1994). 
being absorbed in others and some nations splitting apart, either peacefully or the 
result of a civil war, in this case , slightly less than six million people , who have 
been living in a relatively free society and have developed an enviable system of 
可? 可忍
economic prosperity, are being en1rusted to the good will of the People' s Republic 
of China -- a country which one can politely say_i~ a I~ss free society t_~豆些一些_<2-n g
Kong , whose people have in the past been victims of their own government and 
一一一一-- ;;司令一-一一一 一一一一一
which though is now experiencing the throes of economic growth , is likely to again 
(一一一一一 W一- -一…4…司 τ♂;氾D以 一 - 一- --一…F
experience the dìsrüptions of political succession. 
For the Chinese, sovereignty is 的e supreme power of a state to decide 
independently its internal and external affairs in accordance with its own will (Ying 
1960). Hence the often heard Chinese response to Western complaints of human 
rights , copyright infringement, and other matters, is that the West is interfering in 
matters which are within the sovereign rights of China. The significance the 
Chinese attached to resuming sovereigntγover Hong Kong cannot be overlooked 
JFJ可F
or overstated. Britain's fobthold in China is a continuing reminder of a period of 
weakness in China's history and of the "unequal treaties" China was forced to 
enter into by what were then militarily stronger powers. The Chinese have never 
一­-戶戶-
accepted the notion that sovereignty over Hong Kong was ever vested in the British 
since the Chinese reject the notion that sovereignty can be divided. Under the 
Chinese notion of sovereignty, sovereignty over a territory can only be vested in 
a single state. If it were to be allowed to rest in more than one nation , nations 
would not be equal since one could have shared sovereignty while another would 
be truly independent. Furthermore, to acknowledge that sovereignty can be 
divided , in part, provides a basis to justify the "carving up" of China by the 
4 
capitalist-bourgeois powers of the nineteenth century (Ying 1 960). 
a. The Transfer of Sovereignty Under International law 1'\ L J r ..L 
?子女iyfny又 ~()~j
The transfer of sovereignty ov~r a t çac,t of land and its people is not without 一
~ /'ì1t_ '~ !r~ !1 句r í 計?仇。'. \、 (c 、叫 FJJSJWET
precedent nor is it without support under international law. International law has 
long recognized the right of one state to transfer territory to another state or for 
one state to exercise partial or complete sovereignty in part of or over the whole 
of another country. _ Sometimes the transfer of sovereignty has been the result of 
一-774htQJ心
a sale' tne Louisiana Purchase transferring France' s ownβrship of a vast area of 
territory to the west of the Mississippi River to the United States in 1803 or 
Russia's sale of Alaska to the United States in the 1860's, a treaty , the 1910 
Treaty between Korea and Japan ceding Korea to Japan (Henkin , et al. 1987: 310) 
or the Hay-Parilla Convention of 1903 governing the Panama Canal , by conquest, 
the Indian seizure of Goa in 1961 , or by lease, the United States' lease of a naval 
base in Guantanamo , Cuba , or by agreement, the Administrative Agreement 
between the United States and Japan regarding the stationing of American troops 
i叫
These examples , and others , show that there is no lack of precedent and 
little doubt that under international law the Chinese and the British can enter into 
旦旦_Agreement ， such as the Joint Declaration , for the transfer of sovereignty over 
the territory and people of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. It is 
certainly the minority view in international law that such transfers require the 
consent of the populous . However, exactly this position was argued bγHugo 
Grotius, in On the Law of War and Peace , in which he asserted that "alienating 
5 
sovereignty ... [is1 subject to the will of the people" (Grotius 1925: Book 11 , Chap. 
VI , Sect. VII). While Grotius is the "father" of internationallaw, his offspring have 
generally rejected the "trite" notion that those most affected should perhaps be 
忍 心長每三i
consulted. If the Chinese and the British we~~_ 59 i l'1clîned _as to allow a plebiscite 
on the future status of Hong Kong , survey results suggest that a majority do not 
favor the "one country-two systems" model (OeGolyer 1994: 99). 
b. The Joint Declaration and Basic Law 
The Joint Oeclaration is a treaty between two sovereign states under 
international law and it has been registered with the Secretariat of the United 
Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 4 The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs Office has succinctly stated that: 
[t]he Joint Oeclaration has the status of a treatγin international law. That 
means that its provisions including the Annexes create rights and obligations 
binding in internationallaw. It was registered by both Governments with the 
United Nations under Article 102 of the UN Charter (which requires members 
of the UN to register every treaty and international agreement entered into 
by them) and will of course remain binding on both sides for the years 
following July 1 997 (House of Commons 1994: 38). 
Pursuant to the terms of the Joint Oeclaration , Annex 1, the People's 
National Congress shall: 
enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People' s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic 
Law) in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China , 
stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be 
practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong 
Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for 
4 Joint Dec/aration of the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Government of the Peop侶 's Repub/ic of China on the Question of Hong Kong , 
ratified May 28, 1985, 23 /nternationa/ Lega/ Materia/s 1371. 
6 
fifty years. 
The Basic Law is not an international treaty . Rather it is a law enacted by 
the National People' s Congress of the People' s Republic of China. The Basic Law 
was nominally written by the Basic Law Drafting Committee, a majority of whose 
members were appointed representatives from the mainland , with the actual 
drafting responsibility borne by a secretariat of legal and political experts drawn 
from the People's Republic. 5 The Basic Law Drafting Committee began its work 
in 1985, released a draft on April 28, 1988, and the final law was promulgated on 
April4, 1990 by the National People's Congress of the Peo_ple's Republic of China . 
It is H竺hsidaw anUoi世些旦!但也旦旦hi些~D~_.d豆豆ig坦白空 guide the conduct 
gHTI吐r穹 in _ lJ QD9 Kong oyeL th~、 哩哇~f!!!y years. 
芹的
While international law scholars may want to focus on the distinétions 
between an international treaty and a domestic law, for our purposes it isimportant 
，. 1，弘 一 一
to understand that the Basic Law seemingly had to conform to the terms of the 
1.yTZ令-
Joint Declaration or else it would _próvò ke a VÎo là-t ion of an international treaty. 
However, the ultimate decision as to just how well they conform, as 1 will discuss 
later, is not subject to 旦g豆1 review. It is solely the province of the mainland 
立在三寸;\ 、
Chinese government affected . 
c. The Joint Oeclaration Under International Law 
Although the Joint Declaration is an international treaty and the Basic Law 
\』一一--一一一一-一
is a creation of the People' s National Congress, as a practical matter, what does 
5 For a detailed discussion of the drafting process see Chan (1991) and Cheng 
(1988). 
7 
this really mean? One optimistic citizen of Hong Kong recently wrote a letter to the 
editor of the South China Morning Post arguing that "[t]he Sino-British Joint 
Declaration isadi咐rnational ag叫n也t and the In伽lational Court wo咐 step 的
if any violation of the declaration occurs and China would not dare to challenge 
such international pressure" (South China Morning Post, Oecember 5, 1993) , This 
二三i L 在?
(J \ J !.-.I 
interpretation of the International Court of Justice' s jurisä ictfon could not be further 
from the truth. First, internationallaw is a law principally of states and only states 
may be parties in cases before the Court. 6 For the International Court of Justice 
to hear a case arising from the Joint Oeclaration , that is for the Court to have 
jurisdiction , either both parties must agree to refer the matter to the Court or both 
parties must have previously consented to have all of their legal disputes heard by 
the Court. In the first instance , the parties did not agree in the Joint Oeclaration 
to bring any future disagreements relating to the treaty before the Court . Hence, 
in the midst of a dispute , both sides would have to agree at that time to bring the 
matter to the Court. In the second instance, China has not accepted the 
"compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice and as such , Britain , 
or for that matter any other nation alleging a breach , could not drag China before 
the Court for failing to abide by the terms and conditions of the Joint Oeclaration . 
The jurisdictiona l. requirements of the International Court of Justice are not 
well appreciated in Hong Kong or even among Hong Kong barristers. Martin Lee, 
chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, and a barrister, argued that the 
British should bring the matter of China' s breach of the Joint Oeclaration for 
6 Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
8 
refusing to report the human rights situation in Hong Kong after 1997 before the 
International Court (Hong Kong Standard, October 20, 1994).7 Part of the reason 
for the lack of appreciation is the fact that the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, among others, appears to have tried to hide the legalistic requirements 
concerning the enforceability of the Joint Declaration , both now and following the 
changeover. In testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee, and prior to the 
letter to the South China 凡Iforning Post and M r. Lee' s comments , the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was queried on this point by Mr. David Harris, a member of 
Parliament: 
Harris: What you are saying , in effect, is that if the present 
unfortunate dispute between the British Government and the 
Hong Kong Government on the one hand and China on the 
other continues over Governor Patten' s proposals for 
democracy, there is no practical possibility of this being 
referred to any international bodγor particularly the 
International Court , because China would veto it, and saγthey 
are not doing it. 
Mr. Kevin Chamberlain , Deputy Legal Advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office answered , somewhat obliquely, with the following response: 
Chamberlain: 1 think at this stage, while negotiations are continuing it would 
be wrong to speculate as to what would happen if those 
negotiations were to fai l. We have entered those negotiations 
in good faith with the object of reaching agreement. 1 would 
stress that it is important and of interest to both sides that 
those negotiations succeed , because that would be the best 
guarantee of the future stability of Hong Kong and also the 
need to ensure the so-called "through train" , that is the 
concept that existing members of the Legislative Council of 
Hong Kong will become members of the new Legislative 
Council after 1 July 1997. 1 think it would be wrong in a 
public session of this kind to speculate as to what would 
7 I concede that there was a reasonably good chance that Martin Lee was 
aware of the jurisdictional requirements of the Court and that he was making 
political statement rather than a legal one. 
9 
happen in the event of what, I hope, is a hypothetical situation. 
Never was a clear answer provided. That is, in the event of a breach or claimed 
breach of the Joint Declaration , the parties are limited to seeking consultation 
among themselves. There is no power for either Britain or China to compel the 
other to adhere to the terms of the Joint Declaration. This is clearlγa more 
significant problem for the British than for the Chinese since once sovereignty is 
transferred in 1 997 , the British burden of safeguarding the guarantees contained 
in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law will be frustrated. by the absence of any 
mechanism for enforcement. 
d. The Basic Law and the Chinese Constitution 8 
Most individuals , even those of us who are not constitutionallaw specialists , 
understand that states can adopt different forms of government. Some states , 
such as the United States , Austral 旬， and Mexico have adopted federal systems 
with shared responsibility and authority at both the national and state leve l. Other 
states , such as France, China , Britain and Japan , have adopted a unitary form of 
government in which there may be multiple tiers of governmental institutions, but 
all authority is ultimately vested with the national government. By this , I mean that 
the national government in a unitary system is free to alter the powers and 
structures of the local governments as it sees fit. Margaret Thatcher' s 
reorganization of the local governments in Britain during her tenure as Prime 
8 This discussion is largely based on the arguments found in Chiu (1988) and 
Cheng (1 988). 
工 O
Minister is a good example of the power of a unitary government. As a general 
principle, however, regardless of whether a state has adopted a federal system or 
unitary system, the national constitution is the highest source of legal authority. 9 
This is certainly true under the Chinese Constitution ; 
[The Preamble to the Chinese Constitution provides that the Constitution] is 
the fundamentallaw of the state and has supreme legal authority. The basic 
laws, ordinary statutes, administrative rules and regulations enacted by the 
State Council stand next in line. They are followed by the local regulations 
adopted by the people' s congresses of provinces and municipalities directly 
under the central government and their standing committees. This hierarchy 
is strictly defined , and laws of a lower level cannot contravene those of a 
higher level (Cheng 1988: 12). 
That is , in China if a nationallaw prescribes a certain type of behaviour, the inferior 
units of government cannot alter the prescript. If we look first at other countries , 
we can see how the superiority of national law is supposed to operate. For 
instance , if the Parliament of France enacts a law requiring a national minimum 
wage of 45 francs an hour for all workers , the City of Paris cannot, unless the 
national law explicitly provides for exceptions , enact an ordinance setting the 
minimum wage at 40 francs. Similarly , the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides , in part, that: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; of abridging freedom of speech , press 
or the right of the people to peacefully assemble. 
In the United States, this Amendment restricts both the national government and 
the fifty states from enacting 旦旦y law in contravention of the Amendment. 
In China this supposed superiority of the national constitution and statutory 
law over locallaw does not appear to function as one might expect. For instance, 
9 It should be noted that some governments such as the United Kingdom, 
Alberta and New Zealand have functioned quite successfully without constitutions . 
11 
Article 5 of the Constitution provides that: 
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People' s Republic of China 
is socialist public ownership of the means of production , namely, ownership 
by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. 
But the Joint Declaration and Basic Law grant Hong Kong , after 1997, the right to 
continue to pra竺ice the c叩it圳竺tem for 叮空空空ars 吧?竺吵the Central 
Government of the People' s Republic , under the terms of 1982 Constitution of the 
叫“ R…:一hUjiji斗而ority t。成ptHon5川 ny other 
part of the country from the application of the Constitution . If this situation existed 
in the United States, a nation in which the courts have the ability to declare a law 
unconstitutional or if the Chinese courts possessed the power of judicial review, 
such legislation would , in all likelihood , be declared unconstitutional as it violates 
explicit provisions of the constitution. In China the courts do not have the power 
of judicial review, and therefore Hong Kong's legal position within China is even 
more tenuous since in China political needs sometimes determine judicial/legal 
outcomes. While the present leadership now regards these inconsistencies 
between the constitution and the Basic Law as tolerable , there is no guarantee that 
三7t~
any future leader will not conclude that the Basic Law v-iolates the national 
constitution. When the drafting committee of the Basic Law was offered the 
suggestion that the Chinese Constitution be modified to permit the Constitution to 
conform with the newly proposed Basic Law, the proposal was rejected (Cheng 
1988: 14). As such , on any one day the National People's Congress can decide, 
subject of course to any self constraint that they wish to impose on themselves as 
a result of their treaty obligations under the Joint Declaration , that some or all of 
the guarantees contained in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law are either 
工 2
unnecessary or inconsistent with the Chinese constitution and simply pass a law 
altering the status of Hong Kong. 
11 1. The Future Political Structure of Hong Kong 
Under the Joint Declaration , the People's Republic agreed to organize Hong 
Kong as a Special Administrative Region of China (HKSAR) under Article 31 of the 
Constitution of the People' s Republic. Article 31 provides: 
[t]he state may establish special administrative regions when necessary, 
The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be 
prescribed by law enacted by the National People's.Congress in light of the 
specific conditions." 10 
Article 31 is the legal mechanism which permits the Chinese government to create 
"special administrative regions" which was the mechanism conceived of by the 
Chinese leadership in the 1980' s to unifγthe country . Their belief was that 
Taiwan , Hong Kong and Macau could all be joined together , with China , in one 
nation which would respect the different economic systems and a fair degree of 
political autonomy. However, ultimately , at the internationallevel , there would be 
only one government -- that of the national government in Peking. It is very 
unlikely that the HKSAR model will successfully reintegrate Taiwan into the 
mainland (Wai 1 988). 
The Joint Declaration provides that the HKSAR "will be under the direct 
authority of the Central People's Government enjoying a high degree of autonomy" 
(JD ，可 3(2)). It will have its own executive , legislature , and independent judiciary , 
10 Reprinted from the ßeiiinq Review, 52 (December 27 , 1982) , 1052. 
(Adopted on December 4 , 1982, by the Fifth National People' s Congress of the 
People's Republic of China). 
13 
including court of final adjudication (JD，可 3(3)). The SAR will have independent 
finances and the Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the SAR (JD , 
可 3(8)). Moreover, the SAR may issue its own travel documents for entry into and 
exit from Hong Kong and it shall be responsible for the maintenance of public order 
(JD ，可 3(10 ， 11)).
In fairness to the Chinese drafters, the proposed form of government 
designed by the Basic Law Drafting Committee for the future H KSAR is not that 
different from the form of government imposed by the British as colonial rulers. 
Both systems involve a strong executive coupled with -a weak legislature and 
limited democratic representation. The real difference between the present colonial 
system and the future in which Hong Kong is a part of China is to whom the local 
government is ultimately accountable. Under British rule until 1997, it is to a 
nominally disinterested colonial power physically six thousand miles away with a 
reluctance to use the legal powers vested in it in an authoritarian manner against 
its citizens. The fear after 1997 is that the new sovereign is not as disinterested , 
is just over the border from Hong Kong , and has demonstrated a greater wi"ingness 
to use its legal powers in an authoritarian manner against its own citizens. 
a. Local Governance . The Chief Executive 
The Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive of the H KSAR, shall be a 
Chinese citizen with no right of foreign abode, over forty years old , who has 
resided in Hong Kong as a permanent resident for a continuous period of 20 years . 
The Chief Executive shall serve for a term of five years and shall be accountable 
to the Central People's Government and the SAR in accordance with the provisions 
14 
of the basic law (BL: Articles 43 and 44). 
Article 45 and Annex 1, "Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" address the process by which the 
Chief Executive will be chosen from 2002 onwards. The National People's 
Congress adopted separate legislation providing a "Method for the Formation of the 
First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region" (the "Oecision"). The first Chief Executive of the H KSAR 
will be selected by a 400 member selection committee comprised of 100 
individuals drawn from the industrial , commercial , and. financial sectors , 100 
individuals drawn from the professions , 100 individuals drawn from labour, grass-
roots , religious and other sectors , and 100 individuals drawn from former political 
figures , Hong Kong deputies to the National People' s Congress , and representatives 
of Hong Kong members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference. The exact method to be used by the selection committee 
is left vague. The committee is to select its candidate either following local 
consultations or by nomination and election following consultation. It is not 
specified in the Oecision how the committee is to decide which procedure to use 
or whether the ultimate decision on the method of selection is the Committee's or 
whether it is to be made by the National People's Congress. 
Article 45 says that subsequent Chief Executives of the HKSAR "shall be 
selected by election or through consultations held locallý and be appointed by the 
Central People' s Government." Annex 1 provides that an election committee will 
be formed comprising some 800 members 一 200 drawn from the industrial , 
commercial and financial sectors , 200 from the professions , 200 from labour, social 
工 5
services , religious and other sectors , and 200 drawn from members of the 
Legislative Council , representatives of district-based organizations , Hong Kong 
deputies to the National People's Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong 
member of the National Committee of the Chinese People' s Political Consultative 
Conference. The exact method for selecting these "electors" is left to the HKSAR 
so long as the process is "in accordance with the principles of democracγand 
openness". The Basic Law, Article 45 , also provides that the "ultimate aim is the 
selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination bγa broadly 
representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures." 
While universal suffrage may be stated as the ultimate goal , Annex I implies that 
the Chief Executive will not be directly elected before the year 2012 since 
paragraph 7 of the Annex refers to amendments to the selection process after 
2007. 
b. Local Governance - The Future Legislative Council 
The Joint Oeclaration and Basic Law both anticipate that Hong Kong will 
have its own legislature comprised principally of Chinese permanent residents of 
Hong Kong. Non-Chinese residents may hold seats in the legislature so long as 
their total number does not exceed twenty percent of the seats although no 
mechanism is provided for in the unlikely event that the number does exceed 
twentγpercent. The procedures for constituting the first and subsequent 
legislatures are also specified in a Oecision of the National People's Congress and 
Annex 11 of the Basic Law. And again , just like the Chief Executive , it is the stated 
goal of the Basic Law that the Hong Kong legislature will be selected by universal 
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suffrage. 
Under the Basic Law, the legislature is granted the following powers and 
functions: 
1 . To enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of this 
Law and legal procedures; 
2. To examine and approve budgets introduced by the government; 
3. To approve taxation and public expenditure; 
4. To receive and debate the policy addresses of the Chief Executive; 
5. To raise questions on the work of the government; 
6. To debate any issue concerning public interest; 
7. To endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of 
Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court; 
8. To receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents; 
9. To impeach the Chief Executive for serious breach of law or dereliction 
of duty; and 
10. To summon , as required when exercising the above mentioned powers 
and functions , persons concerned to testify and give evidence (BL, Article 
73). 
The power of the SAR legislature is severely restricted as the Basic Law 
prohibits any member from introducing any bill which relates to public expenditures 
or political structure or operation of the government (Article 74). Moreover, bills 
relating to government policies need the written consent of the Chief Executive 
prior to being introduced . These restrictions , however, on their face , are no greater 
than those currently imposed by the Royal Instructions, Article XXIV, which 
provides "that every ordinance, vote resolution , or question , the object of effect of 
which may be to dispose of or charge any part of Our revenue arising within the 
Colony, shall be proposed by the Governor, unless the proposal of the same shall 
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have been expressly allowed or directed by him." This Article is construed to 
include almost all legislation since the mere act of introducing a piece of legislation 
has financial implications. Hence, the restrictions on the new legislature are no 
greater than those on the old one. 
The Decision of the National People' s Congress on the 
Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region provides that: 
the first legislative council of the H KSAR shall be composed of 60 members , 
with 20 members returned by geographic constituencies through direct 
elections , 10 members returned by an election com R1 ittee, and 30 members 
returned by functional constituencies. If the composition of the last Hong 
Kong Legislative Council before the establishment of the HKSAR is in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of this decision and the Basic Law 
of the HKSAR, those of its members who uphold the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR of the People's Republic of China and pledge allegiance to the 
HKSAR of the People's Republic of China , and who meet the requirements 
set forth in the Basic Law of the Region maγ ， upon confirmation by the 
Preparatory Committee , become members of the first Legislative Council of 
the Region. 
The scheme was to have the last sitting legislature before 1997 become the first 
sitting legislature after 1997. This plan for the legislature became known as the 
"through train". Those on board before 1 997 would be permitted to stay on board 
until the first scheduled elections following the transfer of sovereignty. The 
through train was predicated on the 1995 legislature being selected according to 
the rules laid out in the Decision . 
The through-train was derailed in 1994 when Governor Christopher Patten 
pressed his second of two rounds of reforms through the legislature. The first 
round lowered the voting age to 18; abolished appointed seats on the District 
Boards and Municipal Councils , and introduced a "single-seat, single-vote" electoral 
system for all three tiers of government including the legislature. 
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Following the passage of the first round , the Governor proposed enlarging 
the franchise to include more than 2.7 million people in the Legislative Council 
functional constituency elections and to give the directly elected District Boards the 
sole say in the election of 10 Legislative Council seats. To put these reforms in 
perspective , in 1981 , the total electorate was only 34,381 electing only 15 officials 
(DeGolyer 1994: 92). The second round of electoral reforms was passed in June, 
1994. In response , in late August, 1994, "the National People' s Congress voted 
unanimously to terminate Hong Kong' s present form of government on July 1, 
1997" (South China Morn的9 Post, September 1, 1 994). '.' 
While the British decided to "go it alone" until 1997, the Chinese resolved 
to go in another direction after 1997. By December, 1994, the Preliminary Working 
Committee (PWC), a precursor to the Preparatory Committee to be formed in 1996, 
announced that a provisionallegislature would be formed to prevent a vacuum after 
July 1 , 1997. It was proposed that the provisionallegislature would sit for a period 
of six months in order to prepare for the first legislative elections under the Basic 
Law. Fears regarding the powers of the interim legislature were immediately heard 
but the proposal was defended by members of the PWC (South C力的a Morning 
Post, December 7 , 1994: 1). The through train was effectively derailed and the 
first and perhaps subsequent legislatures will be elected/selected under 
mechanisms not envisioned by the Basic Law. 
c. The Legal System 
" For a discussion of the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong' s political 
reforms see Lo (1 994). 
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It is in Annex 1 of the Basic Law that we begin to get a sense of the 
proposed legal system for the SAR. Hong Kong will retain its present system of 
lower courts. However, at this time the Court of Final Appeal for Hong Kong is the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. The Judicial Committee "hears 
appeals from the superior courts of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man , colonies 
(such as Hong Kong) and such independent Commonwealth countries as have 
retained the appeal from their own courts" (De Smith 1989: 156) . Clearly , some 
mechanism other than the Privy Council and China's National People's Congress 
was needed. The facial goal of Section 111 of Annex 1 is to preserve , as much as 
possible , given the transfer of sovereignty, the pre-July 1, 1997 judicial system for 
fifty years. "[TJhe judicial system previously practiced in Hong Kong shall be 
maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the courts of 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudication" (JD , 
Annex 1, ~ 3). Hence , the decision to grant Hong Kong its own Court of Final 
Appeal. 
The make-up of the Court has not been without controversy. The Joint 
Declaration provided that the Court "may as required invite judges (emphasis 
added) from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal". 
The exact number of judges has been a source of continuing debate. Some read 
the term "judges" to suggest that more than one judge may sit on an appeals panel 
at any particular time. Others read Article 83 to suggest that the structure of Hong 
Kong' s courts was a matter of Hong Kong law to be determined after the 
establishment of the SAR (Conner 1991). 
In December, 1991 , the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) announced that: 
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the Court, to be established in 1993, will be composed of the Chief Justice, 
three Hong Kong-based judges (Chinese or expatriate) and a fifth member to 
be invited alternatively from two panels. Panel A will contain retired and 
serving Court of Appeal judges in Hong Kong and Panel 8 will be made up 
of retired judges from other common law jurisdictions. Under this 
arrangement, a foreign judge will be present in at most half of the Court of 
Final Appeal's quarterly sittings (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 
1991) . 
The JLG proposal clearly showed how the spirit and words of the Joint Oeclaration 
and Basic Law could be reinterpreted by both the British and Chinese and still be 
viewed as consistent with a literal reading of the documents. By the end of 1991 , 
Hong Kong's Legislative Council , in a rare show of independence, voted 34-11 to 
reject the JLG proposa l. The battle line over the future degree of judicial autonomy 
was drawn. 
In the intervening years , the issue of the Court's structure has not been 
easily resolved. The Court was not constituted in 1993, 1994, or 1995. At the 
writing of this paper , the British are pushing for a Court of Final Appeals to be in 
place by 1996. Toward this end , in late 1994, the government consulted with the 
legal community regarding the make up of the Court and the government' s 
proposed legislation. The exact language of the proposed bill was a secret, not 
shared with the general public , although it was acknowledged to provide for only 
one overseas judge. While many in the Law Society, and the Bar Association , 
believed that the proposed "4-1 " system, four local judges and one overseas judge, 
violated the Basic Law, in a very widely publicized , secret ballot a majority in the 
Law Society supported the proposed legislation. The Bar Association , by a vote 
of 247 to 15, passed a resolution opposing the Government's bill. The 
Government's argument that it was critical to have the Court in place before 1997, 
carried the day in the Law Society and the Law Society reversed its position of four 
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years earlier. 
The Joint Oeclaration states that "[t]he courts shall exercise judicial power 
independently and free from interference . . . in accordance with the laws of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and may refer to precedents in other 
common law jurisdictions." Judges of the HKSAR: 
. shall be appointed by the chief executive of the H KSAR acting in 
accordance with the recommendation of an independent commission 
composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and other 
eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their judicial 
qualities and may be recruited from other common law jurisdictions. 
The Basic Law, Article 93 , essentially states that judges ':judges serving in Hong 
Kong prior to 1 997 shall remain in employment and retain their seniority with pay, 
allowances , benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before." 
This provision of the Basic Law was seemingly abandoned by the mainland 
Chinese. In late Oecember, 1994 Mr. Lu Ping , head of China's Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Office and Peking's chief spokesperson on Hong Kong affairs said 
"that the Basic Law gave no details about transitional arrangements for the 
judiciary . . . the appointment of judges after 1997 would be decided by the 
legislature and Chief Executive of the Special Administrative Region (SAR), on the 
advice of an independent Judicial Services Commission" (South China Morn的g
Post, Oecember 11 , 1994). The British position , in response to M r. Lu's comments 
ranged from concern on the part of the Governor that "it would have an impact on 
the whole rule of law" to those , like the Solicitor General , M r. Oaniel Fung , who 
sought to downplay the Chinese position by suggesting that the transfer of 
sovereignty gave the new SAR the right and obligation to appoint judges and that 
the judges would be expected to declare their loyalty to the SAR just like all civil 
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servants who would be "reappointed following a declaration of loyalty" . 
Regardless of the ultimate direction this issue takes , it is certain to have a strong 
impact on the willingness of judges to remain in their posts to see what happens. 
The most immediate consequence of the change in sovereignty, for the judiciary, 
will be the SAR' s difficulty finding and successfully recruiting , both local 
individuals , and overseas judges, who are willing to serve in the judiciary. 
There are many other legal issues which will need to be resolved to ensure 
the one country-two systems scheme works . For instance , even assuming that 
Hong Kong can maintain its independent judiciary and the.rule of law, what about 
the enforceability of Hong Kong judgments in China and Chinese judgments in 
Hong Kong (Keller 1993). As an example , assume that a Hong Kong firm does 
business with a Chinese firm in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong firm also does 
business in China. Would a Chinese court have jurisdiction over a contract claim 
between the Hong Kong and Chinese firms? In the United States, a company 
accedes to the jurisdiction of a locale by simply doing business there and a New 
York company could be sued in Maryland bγa Maryland resident if the New York 
company was doing business in Maryland . In the present example involving the 
Chinese and Hong Kong businesses , the perceived safety of the Hong Kong court's 
protections may evaporate if a judgment was first reached in China. Again , in the 
United States, once a court in one state reaches a decision in a matter properly 
before it, the court' s judgment must be given "full faith and credit" in any other 
jurisdiction in the country. Assuming that these issues are important because 
many individuals believe, rightly or wrongly , that the mainland's judicial system is 
or may be susceptible to interference by powerful interest, will the Hong Kong 
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judicial system be constrained to "enforce" decisions which have a taint of either 
official or unofficial interference? 
Another important legal issue which is certain to take center stage after 
1997 is the question of extradition. Hong Kong currently does not have a death 
penalty but China does. Many countries which do not approve of the use of the 
death penalty will refuse to extradite a wanted criminal if he would face the death 
penalty upon his return. Similarly , other countries refuse to extradite suspects of 
political crimes such as human rights protestors. Will officials in Hong Kong be 
forced to turn over Hong Kong residents to officials in Ch Ln a to face sentences of 
death or long periods in jail if convicted of subversion? 
While some may argue that China is making progress in areas of the law, 
adopting laws on property rights and commercial transactions , updating its laws 
on state secrets , and doing awaγwith extended periods of detention without trial , 
it is important to keep in perspective the current state of the legal system in China 
and the one in which Hong Kong will rest after 1997. Mr. James Peng , a 
successful Australian Chinese businessman , was abducted from Macau by the 
Shenzhen police in 1 993 , held for ten months before being charged with 
corruption. Following a first trial , the Shenzhe門 Intermediate People's Court threw 
the charges out but Peng was held until new charges , of embezzling funds , could 
be brought. As his lawyer noted , "there is no presumption of innocence" and "[i]n 
many cases outcomes will have been determined prior to the trial" (South C力的a
Morning Post, November 6, 1994). Equally important, the new charges expose the 
lack of protection in China from double jeopardy 一 being tried twice for the same 
crime. Other examples abound. Since the assistance of law enforcement officials 
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can be bought in China, one Hong Kong resident was held for more than five 
months by the Public Security Bureau in an attempt to get the man' s son to settle 
a private financial dispute involving the son. 
More ominous in some ways than the above incidents are those involving 
journalists from both Hong Kong and China as such incidents are likely to lead to 
self-censureship following 1997. One mainland reporter received a life sentence 
for leaking state secrets following the reporter' s disclosure of Jiang Zemin' s speech 
to be presented to the 14th Party Congress. Even the reporter' s wife was 
sentenced to six years as an accomplice. A reporter for Ming Pao was sentenced 
to 10 years in jail in China for allegedly stealing state secrets when information 
supposedly relating to China's gold sales was published. 
The ultimate weapon in the legal arsenal of the Chinese political system is 
perhaps the Oecision of the State Council on Rehabilitation through Labour. 
Under this law, a wide range of 'undesirable elements' , including persons 
not engaged in proper employment, persons who do not obey work 
assignments , vagrants , hooligans, trouble-makers , anti-social elements , and 
counter-revolutionaries , can be sent to labour camps for a period of one to 
four year without a formal trial before a court and judicial determination of 
guilt (Chen 1992: 191). 
Article 23 of the Basic Law, amended following Tiananmen Square , now 
provides , somewhat ominously that "[t]he [HKSAR] shall enact laws on its own to 
prohibit any act of treason , secession , sedition , subversion against the Central 
People' s Government, or theft of state secrets..." The open question now is how 
the mainland can ensure that the HKSAR 旦ill enact laws which are acceptable to 
the mainland. However, if it can ramrod such legislation , among other things , 
through the "interim legislature" , the Courts of Hong Kong may have no choice but 
to enforce the law. 
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d. Personal Rights and Freedoms 
The Joint Declaration and Annex 1, Section XIII , provide that: 
the SAR shall protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other 
persons, ... as provided for the laws previously 的 force in Hong Kong 
(emphasis added) , including those of the person , speech , of the press, of 
assembly, of association , of travel , of movement, of correspondence, of 
strike, of choice of occupation , of academic research , of religious belief, 
inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry, the right to raise a family 
freely , to legal advice , and access to effective judicial process. 
The Basic Law incorporates similar freedoms in Chapter 111 entitled , 
"Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents". Specifical 旬， it provides that: 
著 all residents shall be equal before the law (BL Article 25); 
著 permanent residents shall have the right to vote and stand for elections 
(BL Article 26); 
著 residents shall have freedom of speech , press publication , freedom of 
association , of assembly , of procession , demonstration , labour organization 
and to strike (HKAR BL Article 27); 
勢 the freedom of the person of residents shall be inviolable and residents 
shall be free from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention , or imprisonment (BL 
Article 28); 
著 the homes of residents shall be inviolable and free from arbitrary or 
unlawful search or intrusion (BL Article 29); 
著 the freedom and privacy of communications of Hong Kong residents shall 
be protected and no department or individual maγ ， on any grounds , infringe 
upon the freedom and privacγof communications of residents except that 
the relevant authorities maγinspect communication in accordance with legal 
procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into 
criminal offenses (BL Article 30); 
特 residents shall have freedom of movement, conscience , religious belief and 
practice , choice of occupation and freedom to engage in academic research , 
and literary and artistic creation (BL Articles 31 , 32 , 33 , and 34); and 
特 residents shall have the right to legal advise , access to the courts , and 
choice of lawyers and shall have the freedom of marriage and right to raise 
a family freely. 
Article 39, however, goes on to say that the "rights and freedoms enjoyed 
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by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted un|ess as p j;三6巾ed by law." This 
clause fundamentally distinguishes the Chinese view of rights and freedoms from 
. \ 仆.' , 
other perspectives. "Rights in such a system are not inh'e'rènt in the individual , but 
are granted by the state , that is, by the law, and may be restricted by the law 
(Clark 1991: 位). Again , during an in-:甘心
to serve immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, could lawfully restrict many 
of the rights and freedoms currently enjoyed by the residents of Hong Kong. 
Unlike the United States Constitution , where basic freedoms contained in the 
Bill of Rights are stated in terms of "Congress shall make no law" , the Basic Law 
uses the phrase "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech..." The 
guarantee in the Basic Law is not an absolute one. There are many alternatives 
7->-恥、one could cOÍl ceive of under which freedom of speech would exist but it would not 
be an absolute freedom. For even in the United States, as is often commented , 
one does not have the freedom to yell fire in a crowded theater. Freedom of 
speech in Hong Kong , like most of the other freedoms outlined in the Basic Law, 
will be determined , in part , by the other laws which are in force. For instance , in 
China freedom of the press , guaranteed under Article 35 is constrained by the 
4 九、、' ， 1 ~\."， 
obligation , under Article 54, "not to commit acts detrimental to the security , 
UIKU-Jt 
honour and interests of the motherland". As such , an individual may be liable for 
?、
breaching the commands of Article 54 while practicing the freedom of Article 35. 
As an example , the Chinese, through Weng Xinqiao , an official at Xinhua , the New 
China News Agency, which fronts as China's unofficial embassy in Hong Kong , 
have already suggested that celebrations of the "Double Tenth" festival , honoring 
the founding of the Chinese Republic , should be banned by the HKSAR after 1997 
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for violating the principle of "one country" despite the fact that an action would 
violate the principle of freedom of speech (South China Morning Post, October 10, 
1994(b)). 
Wai (1988: 76) argues that in the Chinese conceptualization of rights and 
freedoms, rights need to be respected by others but freedoms do not: "... freedom 
is not unlimited; one can enjoy his freedom provided that other people's freedoms 
L 九， ìì . l' 
are not infringeä as a result. But a right can never be infringed in any case." The 
Basic Law, Articles 25 through 42 , are generally granting individuals freedoms not 
rights. 
Section XIII of Annex I and Article 39 of the Basic Law further provide that 
the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic , Social and Cultural Rights as applied 
to Hong Kong shall remain in force. How they will applγto Hong Kong , however, 
is still uncertain. The two Covenants were designed to convert the United Nation's 
Universal Declaration into a binding part of international law. The Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides , among other things, that "everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of thought conscious , and religion (Article 18); the right to 
hold opinions without interference (Article 1 9); the right of freedom of association 
(Article 22); the right to be free from torture (Article 7); freedom of movement 
(Article 1 2); and the right to take part in public affairs (Article 25). More than 130 
countries report to the United Nations, roughly every five years , under the terms 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United Kingdom, for instance has 
reported three times to the United Nations on Hong Kong. The reports are to 
address the measures which have been adopted by "State Parties" to give effect 
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to the rights recognized [by the Covenant] and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of this rights" (ICCPR, Article 40). 
China is not a signatory to either Covenant and even though both the Basic 
Law and Joint Oeclaration make reference to the two Covenants, China has 
indicated that it while the two Covenants apply to Hong Kong , it will not report on 
Hong Kong's implementation of the Covenants. Hong Kong , not being a State 
Party, cannot report on itself. 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been enacted into Hong 
Kong's legal system, as a Bill of Rights , through legislation passed by the Hong 
Kong Legislative Counci l. As such , the guarantees of the ICCPR are also 
guarantees of the Hong Kong political system. The legislation , intending to be the 
supreme law of the land on the matters contained therein , specifically provided that 
"[n]o law of Hong Kong shall be made after the coming into operation of the Hong 
Kong Letters Patent 1 991 (No. 2) that restricts the rights and freedoms enjoyed in 
Hong Kong in a manner which is inconsistent with the Covenant as applied in Hong 
Kong." 12 The Chinese, again through Lu Ping , director of the Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Office , have attacked the Bill of Rights now preeminent position in 
the Hong Kong legal system and have suggested that it may be in conflict with the 
Basic Law (South China Morning Post, November 4 , 1993). 
e. The Economic System 
On the economic front , the Joint Oeclaration seeks to perpetuate those 
qualities of Hong Kong believed to be important to its continued economic 
1 2 S e e H 0 n 9 K 0 n 9 L e tt e r s P a t e n t 1 991 ( N o. 2) , A rt i c 1 e V 11 ( 3 ), ~ 2. 
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prosperity. Explicitly, the protection of private property, ownership of businesses, 
rights of inheritance, and foreign investment are provided fo r. Moreover, the 
H KSAR will remain a free port, a separate customs territory and be allowed to 
continue to issue its own freely convertible currency. The local stock market will 
continue to function and markets in foreign exchange, goods, securities and futures 
will be allowed to continue. The SAR is given the authority to establish mutually 
beneficial economic relations with other states and in its own name, Hong Kong , 
China , the SAR may maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and 
conclude relevant agreements with states , regions and relevant international 
organlzatlons. 
The Joint Oeclaration goes on to provide that the "above stated policies of 
the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them 
in Annex I to [the] Joint Declaration will be stipulated , in a Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China , bγthe 
National People' s Congress of the People' s Republic of China , and they will remain 
unchanged for 50 years." The basic law is to provide that the socialist system and 
socialist practices [of the PRC] shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region and that Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-
style shall remain unchanged for 50 years. 
Given the over-riding concern on the part of both the mainland and the 
British to preserve confidence in Hong Kong's economic future , many of the issues 
surrounding economic policy have not yet emerged on the political agenda. This 
is not to say that they are not just over the horizon. For instance , the economy will 
certainly become a major issue lf Hong Kong was to run a sizable budget deficit 
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prior to the turnover. Similarly, at the border of these economic issues was the 
debate in Hong Kong over old age pensions. The government was forced in 1995, 
in face of both local and mainland opposition , to withdraw its proposed income 
support system for the elderly. Other issues which are likely to arise, include the 
ability of Hong Kong , after 1997, to actively pursue trade relations with countries 
which have recognized Taiwan. Similarly, if the Chinese currency was to become 
fully convertible , would Hong Kong need to maintain a separate currency? Would 
the mainland allow it? What would become of the reserves now backing the Hong 
Kong currency? Would the mainland argue that since the country now has a 
unified currency , Hong Kong' s reserves are China' s reserves? 
f. Foreign Affairs 
that: 
Under Section XI of Appendix I to the Joint Oeclaration , the parties agreed 
[s]ubject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the 
Central People' s Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Government may participate , as members of 
delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China , in 
negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region , may on its own , using the name 
"Hong Kong , China" , maintain and develop relations and conclude and 
implement agreements with states , regions and relevant international 
organizations in the appropriate fields , including: the economic , trade , 
financial and monetary, shipping , communications , touristic , cultural and 
sporting fields. 
While this provision , on its face , appears to be trying to distinguish "high politics" 
from "Iow politics" , it is very likely that many seemingly "Iow" political decisions 
will have "high" political implications following 1997 and that this distinction will 
be difficult to maintain when the interests or desires of the Hong Kong people are 
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at odds with those of the central government. 
Even in the run-up to 1997, the mainland has had difficulty maintaining a 
"hands-off" approach to Hong Kong's future role as a Special Administrative 
Region. For instance, despite the text in the body of the Joint Oeclaration relating 
to Hong Kong' s ability to maintain its role in international organizations pertaining 
to sport, confusion in this area has been widespread. In the midst of the 12th 
Asian Games held in Hiroshima in October 1994, China's sports minister, M r. Wu 
Shaozu , following earlier remarks by International Olympic Committee President 
Juan Antonio Samaranch indicating that Hong Kong "would be recognized as a 
separate sporting entity after 1997" , argued that such an outcome WâS "keeping 
with Hong Kong's hopes. But China , for its part, has not yet agreed. [China] will 
make a decision through future consultations" (South C力的3 八I/orn的9 Post, October 
5 , 1994). Wu's comments were later attributed to some confusion and several 
days later, Chinese Olympic Committee general secretary , Wei Zizhong , indicated 
that "China would not interfere in the territory's future sports structure." Following 
his non-interference comment, Wei went on to "offer his advice" that too much 
public money was being spent on sports administration (South C力的a Morning Post, 
October 6 , 1994; October 10, 1994(a)). In the future , such advice may look, to 
some , like interference. 
g. Annex 11 - Sino British Joint Liaison Group 
Annex 11 of the Joint Oeclaration provided for the creation of a Joint Liaison 
Group (JLG) to "continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the 
cooperative relationship which already exists between the two Governments over 
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Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration. 
The JLG consists of five representatives from each side and first met in July, 1985 
and it is slated to continue to meet until the year 2000. 
Over the years , the JLG has dealt with: identity cards and travel documents; 
arrangements for Hong Kong' s continuing participation in international organizations 
such as GATT, the Meterological Organization and the Universal Postal Union; air 
service agreements; localization of laws; terms of service for both the judiciary and 
civil service; defense and public order; the Court of Final Appeal; franchises and 
contracts extending beyond 1997; and the new airport and related projects. 
While the meetings of the JLG are held in secret, during the early years , the 
British always characterized the progress in a favourable light . In the 1 989 Hong 
Kong Review (Hong Kong Review 1989: 49) it was reported that: 
[t]he JLG has built up a solid record of achievements in the implementation 
of the Joint Declaration. Its meetings are conducted in a friendly and co-
operative atmosphere which assists the two sides in finding practical and 
flexible solutions to the complex and unique problems with which they are 
presented. The overriding considerations of the two sides is to find 
solutions in the best interests of Hong Kong and its future. 
The tone of these statements took a downturn following June 4 , 1 989 and all such 
rhetoric disappeared from the annual Review following 1990. 
In the years since its initial meeting, one can find some successes in the 
work of the JLG , some progress , and some failures. One of the most evident 
successes is the settlement of the military lands issues. The HKSAR will recover 
valuable Hong Kong land , some of which had previouslγbeen used as a naval 
facility in exchange for building the Chinese Navy a new facility at Stonecutters 
Island. 
Perhaps the most notable failure is the JLG's efforts to localize laws. Many 
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laws in Hong Kong are linked to 8ritish laws, international treaties, or bilateral 
treaties and need to be changed prior to 1997. The JLG has identified about 600 
such ordinances. In the period between the publication of the 8asic Law, in 1990, 
and the end of 1993, only about ten percent of those laws requiring changes had 
been dealt with (South China Morning Post, October 17, 1993). Other failures 
have included the airport negotiations, which although at varying times have 
appeared to be successful , have been a long drawn out process which will 
ultimately delay, by about a year, the opening of the new airport. 
h. Exchange of Memoranda 
At the time the Joint Declaration was negotiated , the 8ritish and Chinese 
exchanged memoranda on travel documents. These memoranda are technically not 
part of the Joint Declaration and under international law are not part of the treaty . 
At the present time, many Hong Kong citizens travel under 81 itish Dependent 
Territory (80T) passports and enjoy privileges from doing so. While these 
privileges do not include the right of abode in the United Kingdom, they do include 
the right to assistance from the 8ritish consulate in foreign countries. Following 
the changeover in 1997, these citizens of Hong Kong will no longer be British 
Oependent Territory citizens. The 8ritish Memorandum provides that citizens of 
Hong Kong possessing a 80T passport prior to July 1, 1997 can continue to use, 
and renew, such passports after that date and continue "to receive , upon request , 
8ritish consular services and protection when in third countries. Hong Kong 
citizens possessing 80T passports will not have any right to request British 
protection in China or Hong Kong after June 30, 1997. The Chinese Memorandum 
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states that under the Nationality Laws of the People' s Republic , "all Hong Kong 
compatriots, whether they are holders of BDT citizen passports or not, are Chinese 
nationals. However, holders of BDT passports will be allowed to travel to states 
and other regions using these passports." As of the end of August 1994, of the 
eligible cohorts which have been processed , those born between the years 1957 
and 1971 , more than 78 percent of these eligible individuals have applied for a 
BN(O) passport -- as they are now called (Shing Pao , September 1, 1994). 
An important question is whether the BN(O) passports will be accepted by 
third party states following 1997. International law suggests that they will not. 
One principle of internationallaw is that every individual possess a nationality, that 
is no one becomes stateless; another is that individuals have 旦旦Jy one 
nationality.13 Article 5 of the Hague Convention provides that "[w]ithin a foreign 
state , a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only 
one". Which one depends on either "the nationality of the country in which (s)he 
is habitually or principa"y resident , or the nationality of the country with which in 
the circumstances (s)he appears to be in fact most closely connected. ,, 14 A Hong 
Kong resident travelling on a BN(O) passport would be , in most cases , "habitually 
or principally a resident" of the SAR and thus , would be treated 豆豆丘 (s)he was a 
resident of China. Clearly , with a right of abode in Hong Kong , China and no right 
of abode in the United Kingdom , the individual would have a burden showing that 
(s)he was more closely connected with the United Kingdom than China. As such , 
13 See Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , December, 
1948 and the Hague Convention of 1930, Articles 3-6. 
14 This section draws principally from Frank Ching , "One Country , Two 
Nationalities?" in McGurn (1988). 
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third party states are under no obligation , under international law, to recognize a 
Hong Kong resident' s claim to be treated as a British subject or to allow any 
diplomatic intervention by the United Kingdom to protect the interests of a Hong 
Kong resident in a third country.15 
The memoranda do not address either the rights of the wives and widows 
of ex-servicemen now living in Hong Kong (estimated to be about 52 people in 
1993) or those of the ethnic minorities (about 7000 people , the majority originally 
from India). Following 1997, the ethnic minorities will continue to have a right of 
abode in Hong Kong , but they will not be citizens of either the United Kingdom or 
China. Moreover, since children born after June 30, 1997 will not be able to 
obtain a BN(O) passport , they will either be stateless or be forced to make 
application to a receptive state (perhaps China) for citizenship. 
IV. Implementation of the Joint Declaration 
It is meaningful to divide the period beginning with the signing of the Joint 
Oeclaration and ending June 30, 1997, into three periods: the honeymoon period 
from 1985 until 1989; the post-Tiananmen Square period from 1989 until 1994; 
and the "runaway" train period from 1994 through 1997. 
a. The Honeymoon Period: 
From the time the Joint Oeclaration was signed until Tiananmen Square , the 
British and Chinese were publicly moving in tandem toward 1997. In an series of 
annual statements in Hong Kong , the British presented their public position on 
15 See Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala ì I. C.J. Rep. 4 (1955). 
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progress toward 1997. In Hong Kong 1987, surveying events in 1985 and 1986, 
the British position was: 
Following the ratification of the Joint Declaration , steps were immediately 
taken by the British and Chinese governments to implement its provisions, 
the object being that the transition of present day Hong Kong to a Special 
Administrative Region of China should be smooth and coordinated , causing 
as little disruption as possible to the social , business , and administrative 
environment in Hong Kong. The most important steps taken were the 
formation of the Sino-British Land Commission and the Joint Li aison Group 
(p.41). 
The work of the Land Commission was described as "having made solid 
progress despite its short history" (p. 41) , and the JLG was described as 
having made significant contributions towards imp l.ementation of the Joint 
Declaration. Its meetings are conducted in a friendly and co-operative 
atmosphere. A good working relationship has been established and mutual 
trust between the two sides is growing steadily. Positive results have been 
achieved in a number of areas of major importance for the future of Hong 
Kong (p. 42). 
What was not revealed at the time was that at the second meeting of the JLG , in 
November 1985, the British agreed to hold-off on political reform in Hong Kong 
until the Basic Law was drafted by the Chinese so to permit a "convergence" 
between the British and Chinese views of Hong Kong's evolution . The goal of 
convergence was that for the British to introduce prior to 1 997 only those reforms 
anticipated by the Basic Law to take effect post 1997. To the extent that the 
British pol icy converged with the future Chinese policy , the transition would be 
seamless. As Mark Roberti argues , during this "honeymoon period" the British , 
eager for prog ress and calm , secretly conceded control over the future direction 
and pace of democratic reform in Hong Kong to the Chinese in exchange for a 
promise of a smooth transition (Roberti 1994: 1 59). The 1987 report also 
suggested progress on travel documents , air service agreements , and localization 
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of laws. 
Hong Kong 1988 boasts the "solid achievements" of the two sides (p. 41) 
and 1989 was described as another "fruitful year" with continued progress on air 
service agreements , localization of laws, travel documents, the Judiciary, 
international rights and obligations, among others (Hong Kong 1989: 49-52). 
b. Post-Tiananmen Square: The events of June 4 , 1989 had a dramatic effect on 
Hong Kong. The massacre gave rise to a new politicism in Hong Kong and local 
demands for greater democracy before 1997. These demands and the British 
response , put the Chinese and the British on a collision path as the British were 
now being pressured to abandon their policy of convergence. 16 
c. The Runway Train: I characterize the final period as the "runaway train" as it is 
starts with the decoupling of the through train. The British , in response to their 
stated "moral responsibilitγand duty to the people of Hong Kong" (Roberti 1994: 
50 (quoting Margaret Thatcher)) and following Tiananmen Square, embarked on a 
process of increased democratization in Hong Kong , pursuing the Patten reforms. 
The Chinese are now proceeding with plans for their own administration of 
Hong Kong. News reports are now appearing floating names for the first chief 
executive. Lo (1 994) suggests that economic negotiations will continue over 
matters like the airport, concessions which straddle 1997, but most, if not all , 
substantive political matters will now have to await 1997. The orderly transfer of 
16 See Roberti (1 994). 
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power will occur without the cooperation of either party. 
V. Conclusion 
One of the stated goals of the Joint Oeclaration to the British was "to 
provide a secure future for all Hong Kong residents -- one in which they can feel 
confident and can continue to Iive and prosper" (Walden 1989: 46 (quoting Lord 
Glenarthur, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Hong Kong Affairs , addressing the 
House of Lords , Januarγ20 ， 1986)). The Joint Oeclaration , while effectively 
changing the sovereign , could not, given the significant differences between the 
policies of the two sovereigns , possibly provide the environment in which the 
residents of Hong Kong could feel confident. The surprising thing , a credit to the 
resourcefulness of the people , is that Hong Kong has prospered during this period. 
With the first part of the transition coming to a close in less than 900 days, 
political disagreements between the parties will escalate in frequency , but not 
importance as the Chinese have already fully realized that the British are effectively 
"Iame ducks" for the remainder of their tenure . The second period of transition 
begins on July 1, 1 997 and is the subject of the rest of this project. 
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